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Abstract—Systems engineering processes coordinate the effort
of different individuals to generate a product satisfying certain
requirements. As the involved engineers are self-interested agents,
the goals at different levels of the systems engineering hierarchy
may deviate from the system-level goals which may cause budget
and schedule overruns. Therefore, there is a need of a systems
engineering theory that accounts for the human behavior in sys-
tems design. Undertaking such an ambitious endeavor is clearly
beyond the scope of any single paper due to the inherent difficulty
of rigorously formulating the problem in its full complexity along
with the lack of empirical data. However, as experience in the
physical sciences shows, a lot of knowledge can be generated by
studying simple hypothetical scenarios which nevertheless retain
some aspects of the original problem. To this end, the objective of
this paper is to study the simplest conceivable systems engineering
process, a principal-agent model of a one-shot (single iteration),
shallow (one level of hierarchy) systems engineering process. We
assume that the systems engineer maximizes the expected utility
of the system, while the subsystem engineers seek to maximize
their expected utilities. Furthermore, the systems engineer is un-
able to monitor the effort of the subsystem engineer and may not
have complete information about their types or the complexity of
the design task. However, the systems engineer can incentivize the
subsystem engineers by proposing specific contracts. To obtain
an optimal incentive, we pose and solve numerically a bi-level
optimization problem. Through extensive simulations, we study
the optimal incentives arising from different system-level value
functions under various combinations of effort costs, problem-
solving skills, and task complexities. Our numerical examples
show that, the passed-down requirements to the agents increase
as the task complexity and uncertainty grow and they decrease
with increasing the agents’ costs.
Index Terms—systems engineering theory, systems science,
complex systems, game theory, principal-agent model, mechanism
design, contract theory, expected utility, bi-level programming
problem, optimal incentives.
I. INTRODUCTION
COST and schedule overruns plague the majority of largesystems engineering projects across multiple industry
sectors including power [1], defense [2], and space [3]. As
design mistakes are more expensive to correct during the
production and operation phases, the design phase of the
systems engineering process (SEP) has the largest potential
impact on cost and schedule overruns. Collopy et al. [4] argued
that requirements engineering (RE), which is a fundamental
part of the design phase, is a major source of inefficiencies
in systems engineering. In response, they developed value-
driven design (VDD) [5], a systems design approach that starts
with the identification of a system-level value function and
guides the systems engineer (SE) to construct subsystem value
functions that are aligned with the system goals. According to
VDD, the subsystem engineers (sSE) and contractors should
maximize the objective functions passed down by the SE
instead of trying to meet requirements.
RE and VDD make the assumption that the goals of the
human agents involved in the SEP are aligned with the
SE goals. In particular, RE assumes that, agents attempt to
maximize the probability of meeting the requirements, while
VDD assumes that they will maximize the objective functions
supplied by the SE. However, this assumption ignores the
possibility that the design agents, as all humans, may have
personal agendas that not necessarily aligned with the system-
level goals.
Contrary to RE and VDD, it is more plausible that the
design agents seek to maximize their own objectives. Indeed,
there is experimental evidence that the quality of the outcome
of a design task is strongly affected by the reward antici-
pated by the agent [6–8]. In other words, the agent decides
how much effort and resources to devote to a design task
after taking into account the potential reward. In the field,
the reward could be explicitly implemented as an annual
performance-based bonus, or, as it is the case most often, it
could be implicitly encoded in expectations about job security,
promotion, professional reputation, etc. To capture the human
aspect in SEPs, one possible way is one needs to follow a
game-theoretic approach [9], [10]. Most generally, the SEP
should can be modeled as a dynamical hierarchical network
game with incomplete information. Each layer of the hierarchy
represents interactions among the SE and some sSEs, or
the sSEs and other engineers or contractors. With the term
“principal,” we refer to any individual delegating a task, while
we reserve the term “agent” for the individual carrying out the
task. Note that an agent may simultaneously be the principal in
a set of interactions down the network. For example, the sSE is
the agent when considering their interaction with the SE (the
principal), but the principal when considering their interaction
with a contractor (the agent). At each time step, the principals
pass down delegated tasks along with incentives, the agents
choose the effort levels that maximize their expected utility,
perform the task, and return the outcome to the principals.
The iterative and hierarchical nature of real SEPs makes
them extremely difficult to model in their full generality. Given
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that our aim is to develop a theory of SEPs, we start from the
simplest possible version of a SEP which retains, nevertheless,
some of the important elements of the real process. Specifi-
cally, the objective of this paper is to develop and analyze a
principal-agent model of a one-shot, shallow SEP. The SEP
is “one-shot” in the sense that decisions are made in one
iteration and they are final. The term “shallow” refers to a
one-layer-deep SEP hierarchy, i.e., only the SE (principal)
and the sSEs (agents) are involved. The agents maximize their
expected utility given the incentives provided by the principal,
and the principal selects the incentive structure that maximizes
the expected utility of the system. We pose this mechanism
design problem [11] as a bi-level optimization problem and
we solve it numerically.
A key component of our SEP model is the quality function
of an agent. The quality function is a stochastic process
that models the principal’s beliefs about the outcome of the
delegated design task given that the agent devotes a certain
amount of effort. The quality function is affected by what the
principal believes about the task complexity and the problem
solving skills of the agent. Following our work [12], we model
the design task as a maximization problem where the agent
seeks the optimal solution. The principal expresses their prior
beliefs about the task complexity by modeling the objective
function as a random draw from a Gaussian process prior with
a suitably selected covariance function.
As we showed in [12], conditioned on knowing the task
complexity and the agent type, the quality function is well
approximated by an increasing, concave function of effort
with additive Gaussian noise. However, we will use a linear
approximation for the quality function.
We study numerically two different scenarios. The first
scenario assumes that the SE knows the agent types and the
task complexity, but they do not observe the agent’s effort.
This situation is known in game theory as a moral hazard
problem [13]. The most common way to solve a moral hazard
problem is to use the first order approach (FOA) [14]. In the
FOA, the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent is
replaced by its first order necessary condition. However, the
FOA depends on the convexity of the distribution function
in effort which is not valid in our case. There have been
several attempts to solve the principal-agent model where the
requirements of the FOA may fail, nonetheless they must still
satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property [15].
In the second scenario, we study the case of moral haz-
ard with simultaneous adverse selection [16], i.e., the SE
observes neither the effort nor the type of agents nor the
task complexity. This is a Bayesian game with incomplete
information.. In this case, the SE experiences additional loss
in their expected utility, because the sSEs’ can pretend to
have different types. The revelation principle [17] guarantees
that it suffices to search for the optimal mechanism within
the set of incentive compatible mechanisms, i.e., within the
set of mechanisms in which the sSEs are telling the truth
about their types and technology maturity. In this paper, we
solve the optimization problem in the principal-agent model,
numerically with making no assumptions about the quality
function.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we will
derive the mathematical model of the SEP and we will study
the type-independent and type-dependent optimal contracts.
We will also introduce the value and utility functions. In sec-
tion III, we perform an exhaustive numerical study and show
the solutions for several case studies. Finally, we conclude in
section IV.
II. MODELING A ONE-SHOT, SHALLOW SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING PROCESS
A. Basic definitions and notation
As mentioned in the introduction, we develop a model of a
one-shot (the game evolves in one iteration and the decisions
are final), shallow (one-layer-deep hierarchy) SEP. The SE has
decomposed the system into N subsystems and assigned a
sSE to each one of them. We use i = 1, . . . , N to label each
subsystem. From now on, we refer to the SE as the principal
and the sSEs as the agents. The principal delegates tasks to
the agents along with incentives. The agents choose how much
effort to devote on their task by maximizing their expected
utility. The principal, anticipates this reaction and selects the
incentives that maximize the system-level expected utility.
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space where, Ω is the sample
space, F is a σ-algebra, and P is the probability measure.
With ω ∈ Ω we refer to the random state of nature. We use
upper case letters for random variables (r.v.), bold upper case
letters for their range, and lower case letters for their possible
values. For example, the type of agent i is a r.v. Θi taking
Mi discrete values θi in the set Θi ≡ Θi(Ω) = {1, . . . ,Mi}.
Collectively, we denote all types with the N -dimensional tuple
Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,ΘN ) and we reserve Θ−i to refer to the (N−1)-
dimensional tuple containing all elements of Θ except Θi. This
notation carries to any N -dimensional tuple. For example, θ
and θ−i are the type values for all agents and all agents except
i, respectively. The range of Θ is Θ = ×Ni=1Θi.
The principal believes that the agents types vary indepen-
dently, i.e., they assign a probability mass function (p.m.f.) on
Θ that factorizes over types as follows:
P[Θ = θ] =
N∏
i=1
P[Θi = θi] =
N∏
i=1
piθi , (1)
for all θ in Θ, where pik ≥ 0 is the probability that agent i has
type k, for k in Θi. Of course, we must have
∑Mj
k=1 pik = 1,
for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Each agent knows their type, but their state of knowledge
about all other agents is the same as the principal’s. That is,
if agent i is of type Θi = θi, then their state of knowledge
about everyone else is captured by the p.m.f.:
P[Θ−i = θ−i|Θi = θi] = P[Θ = θ]P[Θi = θi] =
∏
j 6=i
pjθj . (2)
Agent i chooses a normalized effort level ei ∈ [0, 1] for
his delegated task. We assume that this normalized effort is
the percentage of an agent’s maximum available effort. The
units of the normalized effort depend on the nature of the
agent’s subsystem. If the principal and the agent are both
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part of same organization then the effort can be the time
that the agent dedicates to the delegated task in a particular
period of time, e.g., in a fiscal year. On the other hand, if
the agent is a contractor, then the effort can be the percentage
of the available yearly budget that the contractor spends on
the assigned task. We represent the monetary cost of the i-th
agent’s effort with the random process Ci (ei). In economic
terms, Ci (ei) is the opportunity cost, i.e., the payoff of the best
alternative project in agent could devote their effort. In general,
we know that the process Ci(ei) should be an increasing
function of the effort ei. For simplicity, we assume that the
cost of effort of the agents is quadratic,
Ci(ei) := ciΘie
2
i , (3)
with a type-dependent coefficient cik > 0 for all k in Θi.
The quality function of the i-th agent is a real valued
random Qi(ei) := Qi(ei) process paremeterized by the effort
ei. The quality function models everybody’s beliefs about
the design capabilities of agent i. The interpretation of the
quality function is as follows. If agent i devotes to the task
an effort of level ei, then they produce a random outcome
of quality Qi(ei). In our previous work [12], we created a
stochastic model for the quality function of a designer where
we explicitly captured its dependence on the problem-solving
skills of the designer and on the task complexity. In that
work, we showed that Qi(ei) has increasing and concave
sample paths, that its mean function is increasing concave,
and the standard deviation is decreasing with effort, albeit
mildly, it is independent of the problem-solving skills of
the designer, and it only increases mildly with increasing
task complexity. Examining the spectral decomposition of the
process for various cases, we observed that it can be well-
approximated by:
Qi(ei) = q
0
iΘi(ei) + σiΘiΞi, (4)
where, for k in Θi, q0ik(ei) is an increasing, concave, type-
dependent mean quality function, σik > 0 is a type-dependent
standard deviation parameter capturing the aleatory uncertainty
of the design process, and Ξi is a standard normal r.v. If we
further assume that the time window for design is relatively
small, then the q0ik(ei) term can be approximated as a linear
function. Therefore, we will assume that the quality function
is:
Qi(ei) = κiΘiei + σiΘiΞi, (5)
where, κ is inversely proportional to the complexity of the
problem. For instance, a large κ corresponds to a low-
complexity task while a κ corresponds to a high-complexity
task. The standard deviation parameter σ captures the inherent
uncertainty of the design process and depends on the maturity
of the underlying technology. In summary, an agent’s type is
characterized by the triplet cost-complexity-uncertainty.
From the perspective of the principal, the r.v.’s Ξi are
independent of the agents’ types Θi as they represent the
uncertain state of nature. A stronger assumption that we
employ is that the Ξi’s are also independent to each other.
This assumption is strong because it essentially means that
the qualities of the various subsystems are decoupled. Under
these independence assumptions, the state of knowledge of the
principal is captured by the following probability measure:
P
[
Θ = θ,Ξ ∈ ×Ni=1Bi
]
=
N∏
i=1
[
piθi
∫
Bi
φ(ξi)dξi
]
, (6)
for all θ ∈ Θ and all Borel-measurable Bi ⊂ R. Assuming
that all these are common knowledge, the state of knowledge
of agent i after they observe their type θi (but before they
observe Ξi) is
P
[
Θ−i = θ−i, ξ ∈ ×Ni=1Bi
∣∣Θi = θi]
=
P[Θ=θ,ξ∈×Ni=1Bi]
P[Θi=θi]
= P[Θ−i = θ−i|Θi = θi]
∏N
i=1
[∫
Bi
φ(ξi)dξi
] (7)
Finally, we use E[·] to denote the expectation of any quantity
over the state of knowledge of the principal as characterized
by the probability measure of Eq. (6). That is, the expectation
of any function f(Θ,Ξ) of the agent types Θ and the state of
nature Ξ is
E[f(Θ,Ξ)] =
∑
θ∈Θ
∫
RN
f(θ, ξ)
N∏
i=1
[piθiφ(ξi)] dξ. (8)
Similarly, we use the notation Eiθi [·] to denote the conditional
expectation over the state of knowledge of an agent i who
knows that their type is Θi = θi. This is the expectation
E[·|Θi = θi] with respect to the probability measure of Eq. (2)
and we have:
Eik[f(Θ,Ξ)] =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
∫
RN
f(θi, θ−i, ξ)
∏N
j=1
[
pjθjφ(ξj)
]
piθi
dξ.
(9)
B. Type-independent optimal contracts
We start by considering the case where the principal offers
a single take-it-or-leave-it contract independent of the agent
type. This is the situation usually encountered in contractual
relationships between the SE and the sSEs within the same
organization. The principal offers the contract and the agent
decides whether or not to accept it. If the agent accepts, then
they select their level of effort by maximizing their expected
utility, they work on their design task, they return the outcome
quality back to the principal, and they receive their reward.
We show a schematic view of this type of contracts in Fig.
1a. A contract is a monetary transfer function ti : R → R
that specifies the agent’s compensation ti(qi) contingent on
the quality level qi. Therefore, the payoff of the i-th agent is
the random process:
Πi(ei) = ti (Qi (ei))− Ci(ei). (10)
We assume that the agent knows their type, but they choose
the optimal effort level ex-ante, i.e., they choose the effort
level before seeing the state of the nature Ξi. Denoting their
monetary utility function by Ui(pii) = uiΘi(pii), the i-th agent
selects an effort level by solving:
ei
∗
θi = arg max
ei∈[0,1]
Eiθi [Ui (Πi(ei))] . (11)
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Let Q∗i be the r.v. representing the quality function that the
principal should expect from agent i if they act optimally, i.e.,
Q∗i = Qi(e
∗
iΘi
). (12)
Then the system level value is a r.v. of the form
V = v(Q∗), (13)
where v : RN → R is a function of the subsystem outcomes
Q∗. We introduce the form of the value function, v(q), in Sec.
III. Note that, even though in this work the r.v. V is assumed
to be just a function of Q∗, in reality it may also depend
on the random state of nature, e.g., future prices, demand for
the system services. Consideration of the latter is problem-
dependent and beyond the scope of this work.
Given the system value V and taking into account the
transfers to the agents, the system-level payoff is the r.v.
Π0 = V −
N∑
i=1
ti(Q
∗
i ). (14)
If the monetary utility of the principal is u0(pi0), then they
should select the transfer functions t(·) = (t1(·), . . . , tN (·))
by solving:
t∗ (·) = arg max
t(·)
E [u0 (Π0)] . (15)
However, guarantee that they want to participate in the SEP,
the expected utility of the sSEs must be greater than the
expected utility they would enjoy if they participated in
another project. Therefore, the SE must solve Eq. (15) subject
to the participation constraints:
Eiθi [Ui (Πi)] ≥ u¯iθi , (16)
for all possible values of θi, and all i = 1, . . . , N , where u¯iθi
is known as the reservation utility of agent i.
C. Type-depdenent optimal contracts
By offering a single transfer function, the principal is unable
to differentiate between the various agent types when adverse
selection is an issue. That is, all agent types, independently of
their cost, complexity, and uncertainty attributes, exactly the
same transfer function. In other words, with a single transfer
function the principal is actually targeting the average agent.
This necessarily leads to inefficiencies stemming from prob-
lems such as paying an agent involved in a low-complexity
task more than a same cost and uncertainty agent involved in
a high-complexity task.
The principal can gain in efficiency by offering different
transfer functions (if any exist) that target specific agent types.
For example, the principal could offer a transfer function that
is suitable for cost-efficient, low-complexity, low-uncertainty
agents, and one for cost-inefficient agents, low-complexity,
low-uncertainty, etc., for any other combination that is sup-
ported by the principal’s prior knowledge about the types of
the agent population. To implement this strategy the princi-
pal can employ the following extension to the mechanism
of Sec. II-B. Prior to initiating work, the agents announce
their types to the principal and they receive a contract that
matches the announced type. In Fig. 1b, we show how this
type of contract evolves in time. Let us formulate this idea
mathematically. The i-th agent announces a type θ′i in Θi (not
necessarily the same as their true type θi), and they receive the
associated, type-specific, transfer function tiθ′i(·). The payoff
to agent i is now:
Πi(ei, θ
′
i) = tiθ′i(Qi(ei))− Ci(ei), (17)
where all other quantities are like before. Given the announce-
ment of a type θ′i, the rational thing to do for agent i is to
select a level of e∗i (θi, θ
′
i) by maximizing their expected utility,
i.e., by solving:
e∗iθiθ′i = arg max
ei∈[0,1]
Eiθi [Ui(Πi(ei, θ′i))]. (18)
Of course, the announcement of θ′i is also a matter of choice
and a rational agent should select also by maximizing their
expected utility. The obvious issue here is that agents can lie
about their type. For example, a cost-efficient agent (agent with
low cost of effort) may pretend to be a cost-inefficient agent
(agent with high cost of effort). Fortunately, the revelation
principle [17] comes to the rescue and simplifies the situation.
It guarantees that, among the optimal mechanisms, there is
one that is incentive compatible. Thus it will be sufficient if
the principal constraints their contracts to over truth-telling
mechanisms. Mathematically, to enforce truth-telling, the SE
must satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints:
Eiθi [Ui(Πi(e∗iΘiθi , θi))] ≥ Eiθi [Ui(Πi(e∗iΘiθ′i , θ
′
i))], (19)
for all θi 6= θ′i in Θi. Eq. (19) expresses mathematically that
“the expected payoff of agent i when they are telling the truth
is always greater than or equal to the expected payoff they
would enjoy if they lied.”
Similar to the developments of Sec. II-B, the quality that
the SE expects to receive is:
Q∗i = Qi(e
∗
iΘiΘi), (20)
where we use the fact that the mechanism is incentive-
compatible. The payoff of the SE becomes:
Π0 = V −
N∑
i=1
tiΘi(Q
∗
i ). (21)
Therefore, to select the optimal transfer functions, the SE must
solve:
max
t(·,·)
E [u0(Π0)] , (22)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints of Eq. (19),
and the participation constraints:
Eiθi [Ui(Πi(e∗iΘiΘi ,Θi))] ≥ u¯iθi , (23)
for all θi ∈ Θi, where we also assume that the incentive
compatibility constrains hold.
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 1: (a): Timing of the contract for type-independent con-
tracts. (b): Timing of the contract for type-dependent contracts.
D. Parameterization of the transfer functions
Transfer functions must be practically implementable. That
is, they must be easily understood by the agent when expressed
in the form of a contract. To be easily implementable, transfer
functions should be easy to convey in the form of a table.
To achieve this, we restrict our attention to functions that
are made out of constants, step functions, linear functions,
or combinations of these.
Despite the fact that including such functions would likely
enhance the principal’s payoff, we exclude transfer functions
that encode penalties for poor agent performance, i.e., transfer
functions that can take negative values. First, contracts with
penalties may not be implementable if the principal and the
agent reside within the same organization. Second, even when
the agent is an external contractor penalties are not commonly
encountered in practice. In particular, if the SE is a sensitive
government office, e.g., the department of defense, national
security may dictate that the contractors should be protected
from bankruptcy. Third, we do not expect our theory to be
empirically valid when penalties are included since, according
to prospect theory [18], humans perceive losses differently.
They are risk-seeking when the reference point starts at a loss
and risk-averse when the reference point starts at a gain.
To overcome these issues we restrict our attention to transfer
functions that include three simple additive terms: a constant
term representing a participation payment, i.e., a payment
received for accepting to be part of the project; a constant
payment that is activated when a requirement is met; and a
linear increasing part activated after meeting the requirement.
The role of the latter two part is to incentivize the agent to
meet and exceed the requirements.
We now describe this parameterization mathematically. The
transfer function associated with type k in Θi of agent i is
parameterized by:
tik (qi) = aik,0 + aik,1 H (qi − aik,2)
+aik,3 (qi − aik,2) H (qi − aik,2) , (24)
where H is the Heaviside function (H(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0
and 0 otherwise), and all the parameters aik,0, . . . , aik,3 are
non-negative. In Eq. (24), aik,0 is the participation reward,
aik,1 is the award for exceeding the passed-down requirement,
aik,2 is the passed-down requirement, and aik,3 the payoff
per unit quality exceeding the passed-down requirement. We
will call these form of transfer functions the “requirement
based plus incentive” (RPI) transfer function. In case the
aik,3 = 0, we call it the “requirement based” (RB) transfer
function. At this point, it is worth mentioning that the passed-
down requirement aik,2 is not necessarily the same as the
true system requirement ri, see our reults in Sec. III. As we
have shown in earlier work [10], the optimal passed-down
requirement differs from the true system requirement. For
example, the SE should ask for higher requirements for the
design task with low-complexity. On the other hand, for the
task with high-complexity, the SE should pass down less than
the actual requirement. For notational convenience, we denote
by aik ∈ R4+ (R = {x ∈ R : x ≥ 0}) the transfer parameters
pertaining to agent i of type k ∈ Θi, i.e.,
aik = (aik,0, . . . , aik,3) . (25)
Similarly, with ai ∈ R4Mi+ we denote the transfer parameters
pertaining to agent i for all types, i.e.,
ai = (ai1, . . . ,aiMi) , (26)
and with a ∈ R4
∑N
i=1 Mi
+ all the transfer parameters collec-
tively, i.e.,
a = (a1, . . . ,aN ) . (27)
E. Numerical solution of the optimal contract problem
The optimal contract problem is a an intractable bi-level,
non-linear programming problem.In particular, the SE’s prob-
lem is for the case of type-dependent contracts is to maximize
the expected system-level utility over the class of imple-
mentable contracts, i.e.,
max
a
E [u0(Π0)] , (28)
subject to
1) contract implementability constraints:
aik,j ≥ 0, (29)
for all i = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . ,Mi, j = 0, . . . , 3;
2) individual rationality constraints:
e∗ikl = arg max
ei∈[0,1]
Eik[Ui(Πi(ei, l))], (30)
for all i = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . ,Mi, l = 1, . . . ,Mi;
3) participation constraints:
Eik[Ui(Πi(e∗ikk, k))] ≥ u¯ik, (31)
for all i = 1, . . . , N, k = 1, . . . ,Mi; and
4) incentive compatibility constraints:
Eik[Ui(Πi(e∗ikk, k))] ≥ Eik[Ui(Πi(e∗ikl, l))], (32)
for all i = 1, . . . , N and k 6= l in {1, . . . ,Mi}.
For the case of type-independent contracts, one adds the
constraint aik = ail for all i = 1, . . . , N and k 6= l in
{1, . . . ,Mi} and the incentive compatibility constraints are
removed.
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A common approach to solving bi-level programming prob-
lems is to replace the internal optimization with the cor-
responding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition. This ap-
proach is used when the internal problem is concave, i.e., when
it has a unique maximum. However, in our case, concavity
is not guaranteed, and we resort to nested optimization. We
implement everything in Python using the Theano [19] sym-
bolic computation package exploit automatic differentiation.
We solve the follower problem using sequential least squares
programming (SLSQP) as implemented in the scipy package.
We use simulated annealing to find the global optimum point
of the leader problem. We first convert the constraint problem
to the unconstrained problem using the penalty method such
that:
f (a) = E [u0(Π0)] +
Nc∑
i=1
min (gi (a) , 0) , (33)
where gi (·)’s are the constraints in Eqs. (29-32). Maximizing
the f(a) in Eq. 33, is equivalent to finding the mode of the
distribution:
piγ (a) ∝ exp (γf (a)) , (34)
we use Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) [20] method to sample
from this distribution by increasing γ from 0.001 to 50. To
perform the SMC, we use the “pysmc” package [21]. To ensure
the computational efficiency of our approach, we need to use a
numerical quadrature rule to approximate the expectation over
Ξ. This step is discussed in Appendix A. To guarantee the
reproducibility of our results, we have published our code in
an open source Github repository (https://github.com/ebilionis/
incentives) with an MIT license.
F. Value Function and Risk Behavior
We assume two types of value functions, namely, the
requirement based (RB) and requirement based plus incentive
(RPI). Mathematically, we define these two value functions as:
VRB := v0
N∏
i=1
{H(Q∗i − 1)} . (35)
and,
VRPI := v0
N∏
i=1
{H(Q∗i − 1)} [1 + 0.2(Q∗i − 1)] , (36)
respectively. In Fig. 2, we show these two value functions for
one subsystem.
We consider two different risk behaviors for individuals, risk
averse (RA) and risk neutral (RN). We use the utility function
in Eq. (37), for the risk behavior of the agents and principal,
u (pi (·)) =
{
a− be−cpi(·), for RA
pi (·) , for RN, (37)
where c = 2 for a RA agent. The parameters a and b are:
a = b =
1
1− e−c .
We show these utility functions for the two different risk
behaviors in Fig. 3.
Fig. 2: The RB value function (black solid line) and RPI value
function (green dashed line).
Fig. 3: The utility functions for risk averse (RA) (black solid
line), risk neutral (RN) (green dashed line).
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we start by performing an exhaustive numer-
ical investigation of the effects of task complexity, agent’s cost
of effort, uncertainty in the quality of the returned task, and
adverse selection. In Sec. III-A1, we study the “moral hazard
only” scenario with the RB transfer and value functions. In
Sec. III-A2, we study the effect of the RPI transfer and value
functions. We study the “moral hazard with adverse selection”
in Sec. III-A3.
A. Numerical investigation of the proposed model
In these numerical investigations we consider a single risk
neutral principal and a risk averse agent. Each case study
corresponds to a choice of task complexity (κ in Eq. (5)),
cost of effort (c in Eq. (3)), and performance uncertainty (σ in
Eq. (5)). With regards to task complexity, we select κ = 2.5
for an easy task and κ = 1.5 for a hard task. For the cost of
effort parameter, we associate c = 0.1 and c = 0.4 with the
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low- and high-cost agents, respectively. Finally, low- and high-
uncertainty tasks are characterized by σ = 0.1 and σ = 0.4,
respectively.
Note that, the parameters κiθi , ciθi , and σiθi have two
indices. The first index i is the agent’s (subsystem’s) number
and the second index is the type of the agent. We begin
with a series of cases with a single agent with a known
type denoted by 1 (moral-hazard-only case studies). In these
cases, the parameters corresponding to complexity, cost and
uncertainty are denoted by κ11, c11, and σ11, respectively.
We end with a series of cases with a single agent but
with an unknown type that can take two discrete, equally
probable values 1 and 2 (moral-hazard-and-adverse-selection
case studies). Consequently, κ11 denotes the effort coefficient
of a type-1 agent 1, κ12 the same for a type-2 agent, and so
on for all the other parameters.
To avoid numerical difficulties and singularities, we replace
all Heaviside functions with a sigmoids, i.e.,
Hˆα(x) =
1
1 + e−αx
, (38)
where the parameter α controls the slope. We choose α = 50
for the transfer functions and α = 100 for the value function.
We consider two types of value functions, RB and RPI value
functions, see Sec. II-F. For the RB value function we use
the transfer function of Eq. (24) constrained so aik, 3 = 0
(RB transfer function). In other words, the agent is paid a
constant amount if they achieve the requirement and there is
no payment per quality exceeding the requirement. For the
case of RPI value function, we remove this constraint.
1) Moral hazard with RB transfer and value functions:
Consider the case of a single risk-averse agent of known type
and a risk-neutral principal with an RB value function. In
Fig. 4a, we show the transfer functions for several agent types
covering all possible combinations of low/high complexity,
low/high cost, and low/high task uncertainty. Fig. 4b depicts
the probability that the principal’s expected utility exceeds a
given threshold for all these combinations. We refer to this
curve as the exceedance curve. Finally, in tables I and II, we
report the expected utility of the principal for the low and high
cost agents, respectively. We make the following observations:
1) For the same level of task complexity and uncertainty,
but with increasing cost of effort:
a) the optimal passed-down requirement decreases;
b) the optimal payment for achieving the requirement
increases;
c) the principal’s expected utility decreases; and
d) the exceedance curve shifts to the left.
Intuitively, as the agent’s cost of effort increases, the
principal must make the contract more attractive to
ensure that the participation constraints are satisfied.
As a consequence, the probability that the principal’s
expected utility exceeds a given threshold decreases.
2) For the same level of task uncertainty and cost of effort,
but with increasing complexity:
a) the optimal passed-down requirement decreases;
b) the optimal payment for achieving the requirement
increases;
c) the principal’s expected utility decreases; and
d) the exceedance curve shifts to the left.
Thus, we see that an increase in task complexity has the
same a similar effect as an increase in the agent’s cost
of effort. As in the previous case, to make sure that the
agent wants to participate, the principal has to make the
contract more attractive as task complexity increases.
3) For the same level of task complexity and cost of effort,
but with increasing uncertainty:
a) the optimal passed-down requirement increases;
b) the optimal payment for achieving the requirement
increases;
c) the principals expected utility decreases;
d) the exceedance curve shifts towards the bottom
right.
This case is the most interesting. Here as the uncertainty
of the task increases, the principal must increase the
passed-down requirement to ensure that they are hedged
against failure. At the same time, however, they must
also increase the payment to ensure that the agent still
has an incentive to participate.
4) For all cases considered, the optimal passed down re-
quirement is greater than the true requirement (which is
set to one). Note, however, this is not universally true.
Our study does not examine all possible combinations of
cost, quality, and utility functions that could have been
considered. Indeed, as we showed in our previous work
[10], there are situations in which a smaller-than-the-true
requirement can be optimal.
TABLE I: The expected utility of the principal for low cost
agent with RB value function.
Low Uncertainty High Uncertainty
Low Complexity 0.97 0.93
High Complexity 0.92 0.79
TABLE II: The expected utility of the principal for high cost
agent with RB value function.
Low Uncertainty High Uncertainty
Low Complexity 0.89 0.77
High Complexity 0.72 0.45
2) Moral hazard with RPI transfer and value functions:
This case is identical to Sec. III-A1, albeit we use the RPI
value function, see Sec. II-F, and the RPI transfer function,
see Eq. (24). Fig 5a, depicts the transfer functions for all
combinations of agent types and task complexities. In Fig.
5b, we show the exceedance curve using the RPI value and
transfer functions. Finally, in tables III and IV, we report the
expected utility of the principal using the RPI transfer and
value functions for the low and high cost agents, respectively.
The results are qualitative similar to Sec. III-A1, with the
additional observations:
1) For the same level of task complexity, uncertainty and
agent cost, the optimal reward for achieving the re-
quirement decreases compared to the same cases in
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(a) Transfer functions using RB value function. (b) Exceedance curve.
Fig. 4: L and H stand for low and high, respectively, Comp. and Unc. stand for complexity and uncertainty, respectively. The
low and high complexity denote the κ11 = 2.5 and κ11 = 1.5, respectively, low and high cost denote c11 = 0.1 and c11 = 0.4,
respectively, low and high uncertainty denote σ11 = 0.1 and σ11 = 0.4, respectively, RA denotes the risk averse agent. (a):
The RB transfer functions for several different agent types with respect to outcome of the subsystem (Q1) for moral hazard
scenario. (b): The exceedance for the moral hazard scenario using the RB transfer function.
Sec. III-A1. Intuitively, as the principal has the option
to reward the agent based on the quality exceeding the
requirement, they prefer to pay less for fulfilling the
requirement. Instead, the principal incentivizes the agent
to improve the quality beyond the optimal passed-down
requirement.
2) The slope of the transfer function beyond the passed-
down requirement is almost identical to the slope of the
value function.
TABLE III: The expected utility of the principal for low cost
agent with RPI value function.
Low Uncertainty High Uncertainty
Low Complexity 1.2 1.2
High Complexity 1.0 0.89
TABLE IV: The expected utility of the principal for high cost
agent with RPI value function.
Low Uncertainty High Uncertainty
Low Complexity 0.95 0.93
High Complexity 0.76 0.56
In table V, we summarize our observations for the results
in Sec. III-A1 and III-A2. In this table, we show how the
passed-down requirement and payment change when we fix
two parameters of the model (we denote it by “fix” in the
table) and vary the third parameter. We denote increase by ↑
and decrease by ↓.
3) Moral hazard with adverse selection: Consider the case
of a single risk-averse agent of unknown type which takes two
possible values, and a risk-neutral principal with a RB value
function. We consider two possibilities for the unknown type:
TABLE V: Summary of the observations.
complexity agent cost uncertainty requirement payment
↑ fix fix ↓ ↑
fix ↑ fix ↓ ↑
fix fix ↑ ↑ ↑
1) Unknown cost of effort. Here, we set κ11 = κ12 = 1.5
(p(κ11 = 1.5) = 1), σ11 = σ12 = 0.1 (p(σ11 = 0.1)),
and p(c11 = 0.1) = 0.5 and p(c12 = 0.4) = 0.5
2) Unknown task complexity. For the unknown quality we
assume that p(κ11 = 2.5) = 0.5 and p(κ12 = 1.5) =
0.5, σ11 = σ12 = 0.4 (p(σ11 = 0.4) = 1), and c11 =
c12 = 0.4 (p(c11 = 0.4) = 1).
In this scenario, we maximize the expected utility of the
principal subject to constraints in Eqs. (29-32). The incentive
compatibility constraint, Eq. (32), guarantees that the agent
will choose the contract that is suitable for their true type. In
other words, as there are two agent types’ possibilities, the
principal must offer two contracts, see Fig. 1b. These two
contracts must be designed in a way that there is no benefit
for the agent to deviate from their true type, i.e., the contracts
enforce the agent to be truth telling.
Solving the constraint optimization problem yields:
a11 = a12 = (0, 0.29, 1.06),
i.e., the two contracts collapse into one. Note that the resulting
contract is the same as the pure moral hazard case, Sec. III-A1,
for an agent with type κ11 = 1.5, σ11 = 0.1, and c11 =
0.4. In other words, the principal must behave as if there was
only a high-cost agent. That is, there are no contacts that can
differentiate between a low- and a high-cost agent in this case.
A similar outcome occurs for unknown task complexity.
The solution of the constraint optimization problem for this
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(a) Transfer functions using RPI value function. (b) Exceedance curve.
Fig. 5: L and H stand for low and high, respectively, Comp. and Unc. stand for complexity and uncertainty, respectively. The
low and high complexity denote the κ11 = 2.5 and κ11 = 1.5, respectively, low and high cost denote c11 = 0.1 and c11 = 0.4,
respectively, low and high uncertainty denote σ11 = 0.1 and σ11 = 0.4, respectively, RA denotes the risk averse agent. (a):
The RPI transfer functions for several different agent types with respect to outcome of the subsystem (Q1) for moral hazard
scenario. (b): The exceedance curve for the moral hazard scenario using the RPI transfer function.
scenario is:
a11 = a12 = (0, 0.08, 1.11),
which is the same as the optimum contract that is offered for
the pure moral hazard case, Sec. III-A1, for an agent with
type κ11 = 1.5, σ11 = 0.4, and c11 = 0.4. Therefore, in this
case the principal must behave as if there the task is of high
complexity.
Note that in both cases above, the collapse of the two
contracts to one contract is not a generalizable property of our
model. In particular, it may not happen if more flexible trans-
fer functions are allowed, e.g., ones that allow performance
penalties.
In Fig. 6, we show the transfer functions for the adverse
selection scenarios with unknown cost and unknown quality.
In tables VI and VII, we show the expected utility of two
types of agents and the principal using the optimum contract
for unknown cost and unknown quality, respectively. To sum
up:
1) The unknown cost:
a) the optimum transfer function for this problem is
as same as that the principal would have offered for
a single-type high-cost agent with c11 = c12 = 0.4
(moral hazard scenario with no adverse selection);
b) the expected utility of the low cost agent (efficient
agent) is greater than that of the high cost agent.
In this case, the low-cost agent benefits because of
information asymmetry. In other words, the principal
must pay an information rent to the low-cost agent to
reveal their type.
2) The unknown task complexity:
a) the optimum contract in this case is the contract
that the principal would have offered for the single-
type high-complexity task with κ11 = κ12 = 1.5;
b) the expected utility of an agent dealing with a low-
complexity task is greater than that of an agent
dealing with a high-complexity task.
Again, due to the information asymmetry, the agent
benefits if the task complexity is low. The principal must
pay an information rent to reveal the task complexity.
Fig. 6: The transfer function for the adverse selection scenarios
with unknown cost (solid line) and unknown quality (dashed
line), the agent is risk averse. For unknown cost: κ11 = κ12 =
1.5 with probability 1, σ11 = σ12 = 0.1 with probability 1, and
c11 = 0.1 with probability 0.5 and c12 = 0.4 with probability
0.5. For unknown quality: κ11 = 2.5 with probability 0.5
and κ12 = 1.5 with probability 0.5, σ11 = σ12 = 0.4 with
probability 1, and c11 = c12 = 0.4 with probability 1.
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TABLE VI: The expected utility of the agent with unknown
cost for two different contracts.
E[u1(·)] E[u0(·)]
Low Cost Agent (Type 1) 0.39 0.72
High Cost Agent (Type 2) 0 0.72
TABLE VII: The expected utility of the agent with unknown
quality for two different contracts.
E[u1(·)] E[u0(·)]
Low Complexity (Type 1) 0.52 0.45
High Complexity (Type 2) 0 0.45
B. Satellite Design
In this section we apply our method on a simplified satellite
design. Typically a satellite consists of seven different subsys-
tems [22], namely, electrical power subsystem, propulsion, at-
titude determination and control, on-board processing, teleme-
try, tracking and command, structures and thermal subsystems.
We focus our attention on the propulsion subsystem (N = 1).
To simplify the analysis, we assume that the design of these
subsystems is assigned to a sSE in a one-shot fashion. Note
that, the actual systems engineering process of the satellite
design is an iterative process and the information and results
are exchanged back and forth in each iteration. Our model
is a crude approximation of reality. The goal of the SE is to
optimally incentivize the sSE to produce subsystem designs
that meet the mission’s requirements. Furthermore, we assume
that the propulsion subsystem is decoupled from the other
subsystems, i.e., there is no interactions between them, and
that the SE knows the types of each sSE and therefore, there
is no information asymmetry.
To extract the parameters of the model, i.e., a11, σ11, c11,
we will use available historical data. To this end, let I1
be the cumulative, sector-wide investment on the propulsion
subsystem and G1 be the delivered specific impulse of solid
propellants (Isp). The specific impulse is defined as the ratio
of thrust to weight flow rate of the propellant and is a measure
of energy content of the propellants [22].
Historical data, say D1 = {(I1,i, G1,i)}Si=1, of these quanti-
ties are readily available for many technologies. Of course,
cumulative investment and best performance increase with
time, i.e., I1,i ≤ I1,i+1 and G1,i ≤ G1,i+1. We model the
relationship between G1 and I1 as:
G1 = G1,S +A1(I1 − I1,S) + Σ1Ξ1, (39)
where G1,S and I1,S are the current states of these variables,
Ξ1 ∼ N (0, 1), and A1 and Σ1 are parameters to be estimated
from the all available data, D1. We use a maximum likelihood
estimator for A1 and Σ1. This is equivalent to a least squares
estimate for Ai:
Aˆ1 = arg min
A1
S∑
i=1
[G1,S +A1(I1,i − I1,S)−G1,i]2 , (40)
and to setting Σ1 equal to the mean residual square error:
Σˆ1 =
1
S
S∑
i=1
[
G1,S + Aˆ1(I1,i − I1,S)−G1,i
]2
. (41)
Now, let Gr1 be the required quality for the propulsion
subsystem in physical units. The scaled quality of a subsystem
Q1, can be defined as:
Q1 =
G1 −G1,S
Gr1 −G1,S
, (42)
with this definition, we get Q1 = 0 for the state-of-the-art, and
Q1 = 1 for the requirement. Substituting Eq. (39) in Eq. (42)
and using the maximum likelihood estimates for A1 and Σ1,
we obtain:
Q1 =
Aˆ1
Gr1 −G1,S
(I1 − I1,S) + Σˆ1
Gr1 −G1,S
Ξ1. (43)
From this equation, we can identify the uncertainty σ11 in the
quality function as:
σ11 =
Σˆ1
Gr1 −G1,S
. (44)
Finally, we need to define effort. Let T1 represents the time
for which the propulsion engineer is to be hired. The cost
of the agent per unit time is C1. T1 is just the duration of
the systems engineering process we consider. The value C1T1
can be read from the balance sheets of publicly traded firms
related to the technology. We can associate the effort variable
e1 with the additional investment required to buy the time of
one engineer:
e1 =
I1 − I1,S
C1T1
, (45)
that is, e1 = 1 corresponds to the effort of one engineer for
time T1. Let us assume there are Z engineers work on the
subsystem. Comparing this equation, Eq. (43), and Eq. (5),
we get that the κ11 coefficient is given by:
κ11 =
ZC1T1Aˆ1
Gr1 −G1,S
. (46)
To complete the picture, we need to talk about the value V0
(in USD) of the system if the requirements are met. We can
use this value to normalize all dollar quantities. That is, we
set:
v0 = 1, (47)
and for the cost per square effort of the agent we set:
c11 =
ZC1T1
V0
. (48)
Finally, we use some real data to fix some of the parameters.
Trends in delivered Isp (G1 (sec.)) and investments by NASA
(I1 (millions USD)) in chemical propulsion technology with
time are obtained from [23] and [24], respectively. The state-
of-the-art solid propellant technology corresponds to a G1,S
value of 252 sec. and I1,S value of 149.1 million USD. The
maximum likelihood fit of the parameters results in a regres-
sion coefficient of Aˆ1 = 0.0133 sec. per million USD, and
standard deviation Σˆ1 = 0.12 sec. The corresponding data and
the maximum likelihood fit are illustrated in Fig. 7. The value
of C1 is the median salary (per time) of a propulsion engineer
which is approximately 120,000 USD / year, according to
the data obtained from [25]. For simplicity, also assume that
T1 = 1 year. Moreover, we assume that there are 200 engineers
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work on the subsystem, Z = 200. We will examine two case
studies which is summarized in table VIII.
Fig. 7: Satellite case study (propulsion subsystem): Histor-
ical data (1979–1988) of specific impulse of solid mono-
propellants vs cumulative investment per firm. The solid line
and the shaded area correspond to the maximum likelihood
fit of a linear regression model and the corresponding 95%
prediction intervals, respectively.
TABLE VIII: The model parameters for two case studies.
Gr1 V0 κ11 σ11 c11
252.2 s 50,000,000 USD 1.6 0.6 0.5
252.25 s 60,000,000 USD 1.28 0.48 0.4
Using RB value function, we depict the contracts for these
two scenarios in Fig. 8.
Fig. 8: The contracts for two case studies in satellite design.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We developed a game-theoretic model for a one-shot shal-
low SEP. We posed and solved the problem of identifying the
contract (transfer function) that maximizes the principal’s ex-
pected utility. Our results show that, the optimum passed-down
requirement is different from the real system requirement.
For the same level of task complexity and uncertainty, as the
agent cost of effort increases, the passed-down requirement de-
creases and the award to achieving the requirement increases.
In this way, the principal makes the contract more attractive to
the high-cost agent and ensures that the participation constraint
is satisfied. Similarly, for the same level of task uncertainty
and cost of effort, increasing task complexity results in lower
passed-down requirement and larger award for achieving the
requirement. For the same level of task complexity and cost
of effort, as the uncertainty increases both the passed-down
requirement and the award for achieving the requirement
increase. This is because the principal wants to make sure that
the system requirements are achieved. Moreover, by increasing
the task complexity, the task uncertainty, or the cost of effort,
the principal earns less and the exceedance curve is shifted to
the left. Using the RPI contracts, the principal pays smaller
amount for achieving the requirement but, instead, they pay
for per quality exceeding the requirement.
For the adverse selection scenario with RB value function,
we observe that when the principal is maximally uncertain
about the cost of the agent, the optimum contracts are equiv-
alent to the contract designed for the high cost agent in the
single-type case with no adverse selection. The low-cost agent
earns more expected utility than the high-cost agent. This is
the information rent that the principal must pay to reveal the
agents’ types. Similarly, if the principal is maximally uncertain
about the task complexity, the two optimum contracts for the
unknown quality are equivalent to the contract that is offered to
the high-complexity task where there is no adverse selection.
Note that, the equivalence of the contracts in adverse selection
scenario with the contract that is offered in absence of adverse
selection is not universal. If the class of possible contracts is
enlarged, e.g., to allow penalties, there may be a set of two
contracts that differentiate types.
There are still many remaining questions in modeling SEPs
using a game-theoretic approach. First, there is a need to study
the hierarchical nature of SEPs with potentially coupled sub-
systems. Second, true SEPs are dynamic in nature with many
iterations corresponding to exchange of information between
the various agents. These are the topics of ongoing research
towards a theoretical foundation of systems engineering design
that accounts for human behavior.
APPENDIX A
NUMERICAL ESTIMATION OF THE REQUIRED
EXPECTATIONS
For the numerical implementation of the suggested model,
we need to be able to carry out expectations of the form
of Eq. 9 a.k.a. Eq. 8 and Eq. 7. Since, we have at most
two possible types in our case studies, the summation over
the possible types is trivial. Focusing on expectations over
Ξ, we evaluate them using a sparse grid quadrature rule
[26]. In particular, any expectation of the form E[g(Ξ)] is
approximated by:
E[g(Ξ)] ≈
Ns∑
s=1
w(s)g
(
ξ(s)
)
, (49)
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where w(s) and ξ(s) are the Ns = 127 quadrature points of
the level 6 sparse grid quadrature constructed by the Gauss-
Hermite 1D quadrature rule.
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